To ensure security in data transmission is one of the most important issues for wireless relay networks, and physical layer security is an attractive alternative solution to address this issue. In this paper, we consider a cooperative network, consisting of one source node, one destination node, one eavesdropper node, and a number of relay nodes. Specifically, the source may select several relays to help forward the signal to the corresponding destination to achieve the best security performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is one of the most important issues in wireless communications due to the broadcast nature of wireless radio channels. In recent years, besides the traditional cryptographic mechanisms, information-theoretic-based physical layer security has been developing fast.
The concept of "wiretap channel" was first introduced by Wyner [2] , who showed that perfect secrecy of transmitted data from the source to the legitimate receiver is achievable in degraded broadcast channels. In follow-up work, Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman further determined the secrecy capacity in the Gaussian wire-tap channel [3] . Later, Csiszar and Komer extended Wyner's work to non-degraded broadcast channels and found an expression of secrecy capacity [4] .
When considering a wireless relay network, realization of secrecy capacity is much more complicated. In [5] , the authors studied the secrecy capacity of a relay channel with orthogonal components in the presence of a passive eavesdropper node. In [6] , [7] , the authors demonstrated that cooperation among relay nodes can dramatically improve the physical layer security in a given wireless relay network, And in [8] - [10] , the authors investigated the physical layer security with friendly jammer in the relay networks. In the related work mentioned above, the channel state information (CSI) is assumed to be known at both the transmitter and the receiver. All these schemes are assumed under true channel information reported by relay nodes, and the optimal solutions in these works will not hold anymore if the fake channel information is reported. However, in practice, the relay node always measures its own channel gains and distributes the information to others through a control channel. There is no guarantee that it reveals its private information honestly. Hence, the most critical problem is how to select efficient relay nodes to optimize the total secrecy rate in the network, while some selfish relays may report false information to the source to increase their own utilities. In [11] , the reputation methods are designed to achieve this goal.
However, all these methods require a delicate and complex "detection scheme" to monitor and capture the liar nodes. It needs a lot of signal consumption like an independent entity called "Trust Manager" to runs on each node. Besides, it also demands large amount of data like "REP MESSAGE","REP VAL" to record the intermediate variable in the process. Moreover, this method requires long time of observation because of low speed of convergence. It might be impractical to use these reputation based scheme in cooperative relay network.
In recent years, the game theory is widely applied into wireless and communication networks to solve resource allocation problems [12] - [17] . In the area of mechanism design, a field in the game theory studying solution concepts for a class of private information games, a game designer is interested in the game's outcome and wants to motivate the players to disclose their private information by designing the payoff structure [18] - [20] . For example, the well-known VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism [21] - [23] is a dominant-strategy mechanism, which can achieve ex-post incentive compatibility (truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every player in the game). However, it cannot implement the budget balance of the game [24] , [25] , which costs extra payment from the players and decrease their payoffs.
Thus, it cannot be properly used in the relay network we focus on. Compared with the VCG mechanism, the AGV (Arrow-d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet) mechanism [26] , [27] can also solve the truth-telling problem. It is an incentive efficient mechanism that can maximize the expected total payoff of all the players in the game. Additionally it achieves the budget balance under a weaker participation requirement [28] , [29] .
In this paper, we mainly focus on a relay network, in which all the channels are orthogonal and each relay's private channel information is unknown by others. Under these conditions, we apply the ideas of the VCG and AGV mechanism and prove that the transfer function can meet the basic requirements of the wireless relay networks and help achieve the truth-telling target. We find and prove that the unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium [28] is achieved when all the relays in the network reveal the truth. The incentive to report false information will lead to a loss in each relay node's own (expected) payment. In other words, the competing relay nodes are enforced to obey the selection criterion and cooperate with each other honestly.
Furthermore, there is no extra cost paid in the system when applying the AGV mechanism while the VCG mechanism can not. Since the AGV mechanism is budget balanced, which means the total transfer payment of all relay nodes equals zero. Simulation results show that the relay nodes can maximize their utilities when they all report their true channel information. Any cheating to the source leads to certain loss in the total secrecy rate as well as the payoff of relays themselves. We also observe that the optimal choice for the system is based on the relays' channel information, but in a majority of cases selecting only one relay node for transmitting data can attain the largest secrecy rate of the system. In addition, we prove with simulations that the best strategy for each relay node under this payoff structure is to improve its own channel condition to enlarge its secrecy rate and always report the truth to the source.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model for a relay network is presented. In Section III, we elaborate on the basic definition and qualifications of the mechanism design, and discuss the VCG mechanism and AGV mechanism. In
Section IV, we demonstrate the mechanism solutions to enforce relays reveal the true private information, and analyze these mechanism solutions. Simulation results are shown in Section V, and the conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Considering a general cooperative network shown in Fig. 1 . It consists of one source node, one destination node, one eavesdropper node, and I relay nodes, which are denoted by S, D, E, and R i , i = 1, 2, . . . , I, respectively. This cooperative network is conducted in two phases.
In phase 1, the source node broadcasts a signal x to the destination node and all the relay nodes, where only N (N ≤ I) nodes can decode this signal correctly due to their different geographical conditions. In phase 2, the source node decides which nodes of those N relays to forword information to the destination node. The destination node combines messages from the source and relays, according to the reported channel gains of both relay-destination and relay-eavesdropper links. During the whole process, eavesdropper node wiretaps the messages from the source node and the relay nodes. We assume the orthogonal channel having the same bandwidth W . The source node hopes to gain the highest secrecy rate by properly selecting some efficient relay nodes based on their reported channel information. We denote the number of selected relay nodes by K (K ≤ N) and the set of K relay nodes by K.
In the first phase, the received signal y s,d , y s,r i , and y s,e at destination node D, relays R i , and eavesdropper E, respectively, can be expressed as
and
and y s,e = P s h s,e x + n s,e ,
where P s represents the transmit power to the destination node from the source node, x is the unit-energy information symbol transmitted by the source in phase 1, h s,d , h s,r i , and h s,e are the channel gains from S to D, R i and E respectively. n s,d , n s,r i and n s,e represent the noise at destination node, relay nodes and eavesdropper node.
In the second phase, the received signal from the i-th relay node (R i ∈ K) to the destination node and eavesdropper node can be expressed as
respectively, where P r i denotes the transmit power of relay node R i under the power constraint
is the channel gain between R i and D, and h r i ,e is the channel gain between R i and E. We assume that channel gain contains both the path loss and the Rayleigh fading factor. Without loss of generality, we also assume that all the links have the same noise power which is denoted by σ 2 . The decode-and-forward (DF) protocol is used for relaying.
The direct transmission signal-to-noise-ratios (SNR) at the destination node and eavesdropper from the source are SNR s,d = . Therefore, the channel rate for relay R i to destination D is
Similarly, the channel rate for relay R i to eavesdropper E is
Then, the secrecy rate achieved by R i can be defined as [31] 
where
Besides, the secrecy rate assuming maximal ratio combining (MRC) at the destination and the eavesdropper can be written as
respectively, such that the total secrecy rate attained by the system is
III. MECHANISM DESIGN
In this paper, we use mechanism design as the framework to create an efficient way to prevent relay nodes from cheating in the process of selection. This section provides an overview of essential concepts in mechanism design, the VCG mechanism and AGV mechanism.
A. Basic Definitions and Qualifications
Consider a public system consisting of I agents, 1, 2, . . . I. Each agent i ∈ {1, 2 . . . I} has its private information θ i ∈ Θ i , which is known by itself only. A social choice function F is defined as
where O stands for a set of possible outcomes.
A mechanism M is represented by the tuple (F, t 1 , . . . , t I ), where t i is the transfer payment of agent i when the social choice is F . The utility of agent i:
on the outcome o = F θ i ,θ −i and the true information of agent i: θ i , whereθ i denotes the reported information of agent i, as opposed to θ i . Similarly,
is the reported information of all other agents. So the total payoff or welfare of agent i can be written as the following function:
The objective of mechanism M is to choose a desirable set of transfer payments t i . Thus, each agent in the mechanism will achieve its maximum payoffs. In the following, we define some properties for the mechanism.
Definition 1:
A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if the truth-telling is the best strategy for the agents:θ i = θ i , which means that agents have no incentives to reveal false information. The dominant-strategy IC is defined as
Definition 2: In an individual rational (IR) mechanism, rational agents are expected to gain a higher utility from actively participating in the mechanism than from avoiding it. Especially, in the dominant strategy IR can be expressed as
A mechanism that is both incentive-compatible and individual rational is said to be strategyproof.
is zero, which implies that there is no transfer payment paid from the mechanism designer to the agents or the other way around. The BB is defined as
B. VCG Mechanism
Groves introduced a group of mechanisms which satisfy IC and IR. The Groves mechanisms are characterized by the following transfer payment function:
where τ i (.) can be any function ofθ i . The VCG mechanism is an important special case of the Groves mechanisms for which
where F * θ j ,θ −j is the outcome of the mechanism when agent i withdraws from the mechanism. Thus, in the VCG mechanism agent i could attain payoff as
As will be proved in the next section, the VCG mechanism can satisfy both the incentive compatibility and individual rationality of each agent. However, the VCG mechanism is not budget-balanced and requires a third party agent to mediate between mechanism designer and agents.
C. AGV Mechanism
The AGV mechanism, an extension of the Groves mechanism, is possible to achieve IC, IR and BB. It is an "expected form" of the Groves mechanism and its transfer payment function is defined as
The first term of t i is the expected total utility of agents j = i when agent i reports its informationθ i with the assumption that other agents report the truth. It is the function of agent i's report information only, exclusive of the actual strategies of agents j = i, which making the AGV mechanism different from the VCG mechanism.
In the AGV mechanism it is possible to design the τ i (.) to satisfy BB. Let
then budget balance can be achieved because each agent also pays an equal share of total transfer payments distributed to the other agents, none of which depends on its own report information. We will prove this property in the following section.
IV. MECHANISM SOLUTIONS
In this section, we first describe how mechanism design is applied in the relay system and prove that there is no equilibrium achieved if no transfer payment is introduced to relay nodes. Then, we show the practical mapping from the utility, transfer payment, and payoff of the VCG mechanism and AGV mechanism to the wireless cooperative network. Finally, we will compare and analyze the difference between two mechanisms.
A. Mechanism Implementation
In the network, each relay node reports its own channel information (h r i ,d , h r i ,e ) to the source node which can be seen as different agents report their own private information to mechanism designer. Assume
is a realization of channel gains at one time slot, and relay nodes report their information ĥ r 1 ,d ,ĥ r 1 ,e , ĥ r 2 ,d ,ĥ r 2 ,e , . . . , ĥ r K ,d ,ĥ r K ,e to the source node. Though the information may not be true, the source node will still select relay nodes based on them. Define R i 's private channel
Thus, according to (8) , the secrecy rate of relay i depends ong i . The source node will choose K relay nodes for transmitting according to the relay's reported informationĝ. The principle of source node is to find the K relays to maximize the secrecy rates. The outcome function can be stated as
We define π as the price per unit of secrecy rate achieved by the relay. The relays in the network are assumed to be rational and fair-minded, which means that although they are selfish, none is malicious. The object of relay is to make itself chosen for transmitting so that it can gain payoff. Due to the channel orthogonality, the utility of R i can be expressed
The total payoff (utility) from the system can also be expressed as
We assume that the channel information is the private information of each relay, and thus, the source is unable to know whether the reported information is true or not. Since only the relay nodes selected by the source for secure data transmission can get the payoff, they will not report their true information to the source in order to win greater opportunity to be selected. In this situation, it can cause unfairness in selection and damage the expected payoff of those unselected. It can also decrease the total payoff paid by the system which can be expressed asD ≤D, whereD represents the total the total payoff calculated according to the information reported by the relay nodes.D represents the total payoff when all the relay nodes report the truth. These results can sabotage the reliability of the system and eavesdropper can easily sniff the transmitted messages.
Firstly, we prove that no equilibrium can be achieved under this condition.
Proposition 1:
Assuming that R i does not know other relay's channel information, respectively, secrecy rate. But it knows that each relay obeys a certain probability density function defined as p C j,s 0 ≤C j,s < ∞, j = i . Then, R i has an incentive tendency to exaggerate itsĈ i,s to ∞ to get the maximum expected payoff.
where P (R i ∈ K) represents the probability of R i when being chosen. Considering the principle of choosing relay, P (R i ∈ K) ∝Ĉ i,s and whenĈ i,s → ∞, P (R i ∈ K) → 1, so that R i gets its maximum payoff at infinity. This indicates that every relay node has the incentive to exaggerate its channel information to the source, and thus, there is no equilibrium achieved under this kind of payoff allocation.
B. VCG-based Mechanism Solution
In order to prevent relay nodes from reporting distorted channel information, we propose an effective self-enforcing truth-telling mechanism to solve this problem. By using the VCGbased mechanism, the honest relay nodes gain the maximum payoff, as any cheating in the process will lead to decrease in payoff. Like the VCG mechanism, we introduced this transfer payment of R i as
where D * j (.) denotes the utility of R j when R i does not participate in the system. So the total payoff of R i is:
If one relay node claims a higherĥ r i ,d or a lowerĥ r i ,e than the reality to make its secrecy rate larger, it may get more chances to be selected by the source node, but also will pay a higher transfer payoff to those unselected. On the contrary, if one relay node reports a lower secrecy rate than reality, it will receive the compensation from other relay nodes at the cost of less chances to be selected. By adding this transfer function, we will discuss some properties of this VCG-based mechanism as follows.
Proposition 2:
By using the VCG transfer function (26) to balance the payoff allocation, relay node R i can gain its largest payoff when it reports the true private channel information.
Proof:
We can see from (27) that the payoff of each relay R i is the total utility of all relays K j D j (ĝ j ) when relay participates in the system, minuses the total utility of all other relays K j =i D * j (ĝ j ) when relay i withdraws from the system. It is obvious that relay i cannot influence the value of K j =i D * j (ĝ j ). Therefore, in order to maximize its own payoff, relay i seeks to maximize the total utility of the system. According to our relay selection principle, the total utility of all relays depends on the chosen K relay's true channel information. If and only if each relay reports the true information (ĝ i =g i ), the total utility is maximized.
Hence, the payoff of R i is maximized.
Proposition 3:
Every rational relay node in the system takes part in the VCG-based mechanism for its own benefit.
Proof: It is easy to show that
when the IC achieved (ĝ i =g i ), and the equality holds when R i is not selected (D i = 0). Therefore, for each relay R i , U i (g i ) ≥ 0 and participating into the system is an optimal choice for a rational relay.
Proposition 4:
By applying the VCG-based mechanism in our system, we cannot achieve the BB condition: the total transfer payments N i=1 t i < 0, which means that we need the mechanism designer or a third party to pay parts of the payoff.
Proof: There are two cases of R i :
• It is not selected by the source node (R i / ∈ K), then obviously:
Because of the withdrawal of R i , another relay node with a lower secrecy rate will be selected and its utility D * will get bigger.
Combine these two cases together: K relay nodes will receive negative transfer payment that makes the total transfer payments
Hence, the BB is not satisfied in the VCG-based mechanism.
C. AGV-based Mechanism Solution
From the discussions above we can know that the VCG-based mechanism can enforce every relay node to tell the true private channel information, which can effectively solve the cheating problem in our system. However, as the mechanism designer, we need to pay some extra payments to the system because the VCG-based mechanism fails the condition of BB.
To compensate for this loss, we improve the VCG-based mechanism to the AGV-based one.
represents the sum of the other relay nodes' expected utilities given the reported information
Like in the VCG-based mechanism, we can prove that only if the relay nodes reveal the true channel information, they can obtain the maximum payoff in the AGV-based mechanism.
There is only one equilibrium under this kind of payoff allocation.
Proposition 5:
By using the AGV-based mechanism, the relay node R i can gain its largest expected payoff when it reports its true private channel information to the source node.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we consider the expected payoff of R 1 . Since R 1 only knows its own channel information, we can calculate the payoff according to the transfer payment function (28) as
We can see that there are two terms in the right side of (30) . The first one represents the total expected payoff when R 1 reportsĝ 1 as its channel information (the expectation is calculated by R 1 itself). Since the other term being independent ofg 1 , only the first term decides the expected payoff of R 1 . As we have shown above, the total payoff is based on the real secrecy rate. Only when the K relays with top K secrecy rate are selected, the total payoff will be maximized. Any cheating leads to a decrease in all relays' total payoff, and therefore, the expectation E[U 1 (ĝ 1 )] can get the maximum when R 1 reports its true channel information. Similarly, each relay node in the network has an incentive to report its true channel information (ĝ i =g i ). Thus, the equilibrium is achieved under this condition.
Proposition 6:
Each relay node could gain a positive expected payoff in the AGV-based mechanism, which ensures that every relay would like to take part in this mechanism.
Proof: From (28) and (29) it is easy to derive R i 's expected payoff:
According to (25) ,
Since among all the relay nodes there are always some nodes being selected, the right side of the equation above
Therefore, R i can gain a payoff more than 0, and thus, the IR is satisfied.
Proposition 7:
In the AGV-based mechanism, the system can achieve budget balance, which means that we, as the mechanism designer, will not pay any extra payment to the system.
Proof:
If we calculate the total transfer payment of all relays, we could get
This implies that the proposed transfer function can realize a payment reallocation among the relay nodes, and no extra payment is required to be paid by the system or by the relay nodes.
D. The Value of K
In the discussion above, we assumed that the value of K is fixed and the source node always choose K relays for cooperating. However, it is easy to see that different K can lead to different results in the total secrecy rate of the network. So we did some research to figure out the optimal amount K of relays the source node should select.
In our system model, the total secrecy attained of the system is (11) . By using the AGV mechanism, each relay reports the truth. Now we assume each relay's reported information is SNR r i ,d and SNR r i ,e . Let k i = SNR r i ,d
SNRr i ,e . Sort k i in descending order, and get
Obviously, the relay which has a larger C i,s also has a larger k i according to (8) . We denote that R (1) is the best relay which has the largest secrecy rate, R (2) is the second best, and so forth. Then the optimal selection strategy of the source node is described as below:
1. Select R (1) for transmitting. Let i = 1 and calculate
, proceed step 3 and if Ψ i ≥ k (i+1) , skip to step 4.
3. Select R (i+1) and calculate
. Then let i = i + 1 and go back to step 2.
Let K = i and stop.

Proposition 8:
The system can attain the largest secrecy rate by selecting K relays for transmitting data, where K is decided by the process above.
Proof: By the selection strategy of the source described above, it is easy to prove that Ψ K is the maximum among {Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 , . . . , Ψ N }. According to (11) , the total secrecy rate of the network when selecting i relays can be expressed as C s,sys (i) = W log 2 Ψ i . When i = K, Ψ K can get the maximum, and obviously C s,sys (K) is the largest. Therefore, it is the best choice for the source to select K relays in the system. In many cases, because of the geographic conditions, the direct transmission is very weak compared with relay transmission which means that the selected relay has a SNR r i ,d > (2) . Thus, K = 1 is the best choice, which means the source should only select one best relay for transmitting data. More than one relay node would lead to a decrease in the total secrecy rate of the system.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results of the wireless relay system in the VCG-based mechanism and AGV-based mechanism, respectively. Specifically, to simplify the calculation and simulation, we assume that each relay node first calculates its own secrecy rate according to its channel information, and then reports it to the source. Without considering the process of calculating πC i,s , we assign random values x i to indicate πC i,s (i = 1, 2, . . . , N), which not affect the "outcome" or source's selection result. Furthermore, we assume that though R i does not know other relays' channel information, it knows that every reported value obeys the probability density function: e −x i x i ∈ [0, ∞) and
Firstly, we consider a system with N = 4 relay nodes and from which the source node chooses K = 2 relays. A random sample of these relay nodes' secrecy rates is obtained as Fig. 2 we can observe that when they all tell the truth, the larger the true value of secrecy rate of one relay node is, the more the payoff it gains. For example, R 4 has the largest secrecy rate (C 4,s = 1.3210) and its payoff is the largest up to 0.5822 when it reports the true value. It is higher than the other three relay nodes' payoff even though it is not as much as πC 4,s = 1.3210, which is paid by the destination node because of the transfer payment.
In Fig. 3 we demonstrate the transfer payment of each relay they calculate from their own angles when they report different secrecy rates. As is evident in the figure, each relay has the same transfer payment curve. This is because we assume each relay only knows the other relays report secrecy rates obey the negative exponential distribution. So the difference of the utility of the others relays whether the relay participates the mechanism or not is the same for each relay. We can also see that they are all monotone decreasing because the larger the reported value is, the more transfer payoff should be paid to others. Besides, as the reported secrecy rate continuously increases, the transfer payoff will tend to a fixed value. It is because this very large reported value will always be larger than the others, the "outcome" or source's selection will be fixed whether this relay node is in this system or not. So the transfer payment will be a fixed value when the reported value becomes very large. The curve of R i 's payoff in Fig. 2 is the same reason. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the results when we use the AGV-based mechanism in the system.
In Fig. 4 , four curves show the expected payoff of R 1 -R 4 . It is obvious to see that each relay maximizes its payoff when they report the true secrecy rate. Compared with Fig. 2 , we can see each relay's payoff is higher in the AGV-based mechanism than that in the VCG-based mechanism. It means that the AGV-based mechanism can maximize all the relay nodes payoff which is more attractive for relay node to attend. From Fig. 5 we also find that R 1 's and R 4 's transfer payoffs are negative while the other two's are positive when they tell the truth. This is because R 1 and R 4 are actually selected by the source node and need to pay the transfer payment while R 2 and R 3 are not. By using the AGV-based mechanism, the relay nodes with smaller secrecy rate will get compensations from those with larger ones. It can balance the payment allocation of the system and benefit those in worse physical conditions. Furthermore, we calculate the expected transfer payoff of R i when they all report the truth: t 1 = −0.1247, t 2 = 0.1570, t 3 = 0.2831, t 4 = −0.3154 and t 1 + t 2 + t 3 + t 4 = 0, which is in accord with the equation (25) . Hence the system is budget balanced and no extra payment is paid into or out of the network. In conclusion, we can confirm that the AGV-based mechanism is more compatible for our system than the VCG-based mechanism. Moreover, we show the payoff of R 1 with changing secrecy rate when it reports different secrecy rate in Fig. 6 . It is obvious that no matter what true secrecy rate of R 1 is, R 1 always gains its maximum payoff when it reports its own true secrecy rate.
In addition, we analyze the effects of the reported secrecy rate versus the value of K in the AGV-based mechanism. As an example, we set the relay node R 1 be the interested one and its secrecy rate is 1.0132. In Fig. 7 , we observe that the relay node R 1 achieve the maximum expected payoffs when it reports the true secrecy rate with different K. When K equals to 1, the payoff of the relay node R 1 is the lowest. And the larger the reported value, the smaller the expected payoff shows. When K equals 2 and 3, the expected payoff becomes a fixed value as the reported secrecy rate continuously increases. Because the transfer payment is a part of the total payoff, the change of the expected payoff can be translated by the transfer payment, which is shown in Fig. 8 . When K equals to 1 and this relay reports a larger secrecy rate, the expected transfer payment is a small and negative value. So the expected payoff of the relay node is minor. When K equals to 2 and 3, the slope of the curves becomes smoother as the reported value increases. This shows the change trend of the relay node's payoff from the other point of view. Meanwhile, it implies that the transfer payoff is helpful to control the payoff for fairness among relay nodes.
Finally, we focus on the effect of the value of K on the total system secrecy. Here we assume W = ln 2 then C s,sys (K) = ln(Ψ(k)). Let N = 6, the direct transmission SNR to destination and eavesdropper are 9.64dB and 5.47dB, respectively, and given two random samples for R i 's report information (SNR r i ,d and SNR r i ,e ). In one sample we assume each value has the same order of magnitude with 1 (1dB < SNR < 10dB) : SNR r i ,d = {6.1734, 0.6273, 6.1954}, (dB). In the other sample we assume each value has the same order of magnitude with 10 (10dB < SNR < 20dB) : 13 .648}, (dB). The simulation result is showed in Fig. 9 , and we can observe that in the low SNR situation, C s,sys is maximized when the source select 2 and 3 relays, respectively. Thus, they attain the maximum secrecy at K = 2 and K = 3. However, in the high SNR situation showed in Fig. 9 , when all of the channel conditions are better, the best choice for the system is to choose only one relay (K = 1) for transmitting. All these results are based on the fact that all relays will reveal their true channel information which is ensured by the AGV mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed and applied the ideas of mechanism design into the wireless relay network to guarantee the strategy-proof during the process of relay selection when considering secure data transmission. We proved that by using the VCG mechanism and AGV mechanism, each relay node gets its maximum payoff only when it reveals its true channel information, and any deviation from the truth will lead to a loss in its own (expect) payoff as well as the total secrecy rate. We compared these two mechanisms and illustrated that the AGV mechanism is more compatible for our system when taking the budget balance constraint into consideration. We proved that the strategy-proof and budget balance of the system can be achieved in the AGV mechanism, which makes our model more practical in reality. Simulation results verified these conclusions. Moreover, we proposed and proved the best choice for the source node in deciding how many relays it should select to get the maximum secrecy rate of the network. In good channel conditions with higher SNR, it is better to select only one relay for transmitting data.
